This paper examines the illiquidity of corporate bonds and its asset-pricing implications using an empirical measure of illiquidity based on the magnitude of transitory price movements. Relying on transaction-level data for a broad cross-section of corporate bonds from 2003 through 2009, we show that the illiquidity in corporate bonds is substantial, significantly greater than what can be explained by bid-ask spreads. We also find a strong commonality in the time variation of bond illiquidity, which rises sharply during the 2008 crisis. More importantly, we establish a strong link between our illiquidity measure and bond prices, both in aggregate and in the cross-section. In aggregate, we find that changes in the market level of illiquidity explain a substantial part of the time variation in yield spreads of high-rated (AAA through A) bonds. During the 2008 crisis, this aggregate illiquidity component in yield spreads becomes even more important, over-shadowing the credit risk component. In the cross-section, we find that the bond-level illiquidity measure explains individual bond yield spreads with large economic significance.
Introduction
The illiquidity of the US corporate bond market has captured the interest and attention of researchers, practitioners and policy makers alike. The fact that illiquidity is important in the pricing of corporate bonds is widely recognized, but the evidence is mostly qualitative and indirect. In particular, our understanding remains limited with respect to the relative importance of illiquidity and credit risk in determining corporate bond spreads and how their importance varies with market conditions. The financial crisis of 2008 has brought renewed interest and a sense of urgency to this topic when concerns over both illiquidity and credit risk intensified at the same time and it was not clear which one was the dominating force in driving up the corporate bond spreads.
The main objective of this paper is to provide a direct assessment on the pricing impact of illiquidity in corporate bonds, at both the individual bond level and the aggregate level.
Recognizing that a sensible measure of illiquidity is essential to such a task, we first use transaction-level data of corporate bonds to construct a simple and yet robust measure of illiquidity, γ, for each individual bond. Aggregating this measure of illiquidity across individual bonds, we find a substantial level of commonality. In particular, the aggregate illiquidity comoves in an important way with the aggregate market condition, including market risk as Using the aggregate γ measure for corporate bonds, we set out to examine the relative importance of illiquidity and credit risk in explaining the time variation of aggregate bond spreads. We find that illiquidity is by far the most important factor in explaining the monthly changes in the US aggregate yield spreads of high-rated bonds (AAA through A), with an R-squared ranging from 47% to 60%. Adding an aggregate CDS index as a proxy for aggregate credit risk, we find that it also plays an important role, as expected, increasing the R-square by 13 to 30 percentage points, but illiquidity remains the dominant force. Despite the significant positive correlation with the aggregate illiquidity measure γ, the CBOE VIX index has no additional explanatory power for aggregate bond spreads. We also find that while during nor-mal times, aggregate illiquidity and aggregate credit risk are equally important in explaining yield spreads of high-rated bonds, with an R-squared of roughly 20% for illiquidity alone and a combined R-squared of around 40%, illiquidity becomes much more important during the 2008 crisis, over-shadowing credit risk. This is especially true for AAA-rated bonds, whose connection to credit risk becomes insignificant when 2008 and 2009 data are included, while its connection to illiquidity increases significantly. Relating this observation to the discussion on whether the 2008 crisis was mainly a liquidity or credit crisis, our results suggest that as far as high-rated corporate bonds are concerned, the sudden increase in illiquidity was the dominating factor in driving up the yield spreads.
Given that γ is constructed for individual bonds, we further examine the pricing implication of illiquidity at the bond level. We find that γ explains the cross-sectional variation of bond yield spreads with large economic significance. Controlling for bond rating categories, we perform monthly cross-sectional regressions of bond yield spreads on bond illiquidity and find a positive and significant relation. This relation persists when we control for credit risk using CDS spreads. Our result indicates that for two bonds in the same rating category, a two standard deviation difference in their bond illiquidity leads to a difference in their yield spreads as large as 70 bps. Given that our sample focuses exclusively on investment-grade bonds, this magnitude of economic significance is rather high. In contrast, other proxies of illiquidity used in previous analysis such as quoted bid-ask spreads or the percentage of trading days are either insignificant in explaining the cross-sectional average yield spreads or show up with the wrong sign. Moreover, the economic significance of γ remains robust in its magnitude and statistical significance after controlling for a spectrum of variables related to the bond's fundamentals as well as bond characteristics. In particular, other liquidity related variables such as bond age, issuance size, and average trade size do not change this result in a significant way.
Our empirical findings contribute to the existing literature in several important ways. In evaluating the implication of illiquidity on corporate bond spreads, many studies focus on the credit component and attribute the unexplained portion in corporate bond spreads to illiquidity.
1 In contrast, our paper uses a direct measure of illiquidity to examine the pricing 1 For example, Huang and Huang (2003) find that yield spreads for corporate bonds are too high to be explained by credit risk and question the economic content of the unexplained portion of yield spreads. ColinDufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) find that variables that should in theory determine credit spread changes in fact have limited explanatory power, and again question the economic content of the unexplained portion. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) use CDS as a proxy for credit risk and find that a majority of bond spreads can be attributed to credit risk and the non-default component is related to bond-specific impact of illiquidity in corporate bond spreads, both in aggregate and in the cross-section. We are able to quantify the relative importance of illiquidity and credit and examine the extent to which it varied over time, including the 2008 crisis.
We also contribute to the existing literature by constructing a simple, yet robust measure of illiquidity for corporate bonds. Several measures of illiquidity have been examined in previous work. One frequently used measure is the effective bid-ask spread, which is analyzed in detail by Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) .
2 Although the bid-ask spread is a direct and potentially important indicator of illiquidity, it does not fully capture many important aspects of liquidity such as market depth and resilience. Alternatively, relying on theoretical pricing models to gauge the impact of illiquidity allows for direct estimation of its influence on prices, but suffers from potential mis-specifications of the pricing model. In constructing a measure of illiquidity, we take advantage of a salient feature of illiquidity. That is, the lack of liquidity in an asset gives rise to transitory components in its prices, and thus the magnitude of such transitory price movements reflects the degree of illiquidity in the market.
3 Since transitory price movements lead to negatively serially correlated price changes, the negative of the autocovariance in relative price changes, which we denote by γ, gives a meaningful measure of illiquidity. In the simplest case when the transitory price movements arise from bid-ask bounce, as considered by Roll (1984) , 2 √ γ equals the bid-ask spread. But in more general cases, γ captures the broader impact of illiquidity on prices, above and beyond the effect of bid-ask spread. Moreover, it does so without relying on specific bond pricing models.
Indeed, our results show that the lack of liquidity in the corporate bond market is substantially beyond what the bid-ask spread captures. Estimating γ for a broad cross-section of the most liquid corporate bonds in the U.S. market, we find a median γ of 0.56. In contrast, the median γ implied by the quoted bid-ask spreads is 0.026, which is only a tiny fraction of the estimated γ. Converting these numbers to the γ-implied bid-ask spread, our median estimate of γ implies a percentage bid-ask spread of 1.50%, significantly larger than the median quoted bid-ask spread of 0.28% or the estimated bid-ask spread reported by Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) (see Section 5 for more details).
illiquidity such as quoted bid-ask spreads. Bao and Pan (2008) document a significant amount of transitory excess volatility in corporate bond returns and attribute this excess volatility to the illiquidity of corporate bonds.
Finally, our paper also adds to the literature that examines the pricing impact of illiquidity on corporate bond yield spreads. Using illiquidity proxies that include quoted bid-ask spreads and the percentage of zero returns, Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) find that more illiquid bonds have higher yield spreads. 4 We find that γ is by far more important in explaining corporate bond spreads in the cross-section. In fact, for our sample of bonds, we do not see a meaningful connection between bond yield spreads and quoted bid-ask spreads or the percentage of non-trading days (either statistically insignificant or with the wrong sign). Using a alternative illiquidity measure proposed by Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) , Lin, Wang, and Wu (2010) focus instead on changes in illiquidity as a risk and find that a systematic illiquidity risk is priced by the cross-section of corporate bond returns. Given the relatively short sample, however, we find the bond returns to be too noisy to allow for any meaningful test in the space of risk factors.
5 Their results are complementary to ours in the sense that theirs connect risk factors to risk premiums while ours connect characteristics to prices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the data, and Section 3 describes γ and its cross-sectional and time-series properties. In Section 4, we investigate the assetpricing implications of illiquidity. Section 5 compares γ with the effect of bid-ask spreads.
Further properties of γ are provided in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Data Description and Summary
The main dataset used for this paper is FINRA's TRACE (Transaction Reporting and Compliance Engine). This dataset is a result of recent regulatory initiatives to increase the price transparency in secondary corporate bond markets. FINRA, formerly the NASD, is responsible for operating the reporting and dissemination facility for over-the-counter corporate bond 4 Using nine liquidity proxies including issuance size, age, missing prices, and yield volatility, Houweling, Mentink, and Vorst (2003) reach similar conclusions for euro corporate bonds. de Jong and Driessen (2005) find that systematic liquidity risk factors for the Treasury bond and equity markets are priced in corporate bonds, and Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2005) address a similar question. Using a proprietary dataset on institutional holdings of corporate bonds, Nashikkar, Mahanti, Subrahmanyam, Chacko, and Mallik (2008) and Mahanti, Nashikkar, and Subrahmanyam (2008) propose a measure of latent liquidity and examine its connection with the pricing of corporate bonds and credit default swaps.
5 Adding NAIC to the TRACE data, Lin, Wang, and Wu (2010) have a longer sample period. However, we find the NAIC data to be problematic. For example, a large fraction of transaction prices reported there cannot be matched with the TRACE data for our sample. In addition, while Lin, Wang, and Wu (2010) report that insurance companies own about one-third of corporate bonds outstanding, Nashikkar, Mahanti, Subrahmanyam, Chacko, and Mallik (2008) note that insurance companies are typically buy-and-hold investors and have low portfolio turnover. These issues make the construction of a reliable illiquidity measure using NAIC data difficult. In our study, we drop the early sample period with only Phase I coverage. We also drop all of the Phase III only bonds. We sacrifice in these two dimensions in order to maintain a balanced sample of Phase I and II bonds from April 14, 2003 to June 30, 2009 . Of course, new issuances and retired bonds generate some time variation in the cross-section of bonds in our sample. After cleaning up the data, we also take out the repeated inter-dealer trades by deleting trades with the same bond, date, time, price, and volume as the previous trade.
6 We further require the bonds in our sample to have frequent enough trading so that the illiquidity measure can be constructed from the trading data. Specifically, during its existence in the TRACE data, a bond must trade on at least 75% of its relevant business days in order to be included in our sample. To avoid bonds that show up just for several months and then disappear from TRACE, we require the bonds in our sample to be in existence in the TRACE data for at least one full year. Finally, we restrict our sample to investment grade bonds as the junk grade bonds included during Phases I and II were selected primarily for their liquidity and are unlikely to represent the typical junk grade bonds in TRACE. Table 1 summarizes The bonds in our sample are typically large, with a median issuance size of $750 million, and the representative bonds in our sample are investment grade, with a median rating of 6, which translates to Moody's A2. The average maturity is close to 6 years and the average age is about 4 years. Over time, we see a gradual reduction in maturity and increase in age.
This can be attributed to our sample selection which excludes bonds issued after February 7,
2005, the beginning of Phase III.
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Given our selection criteria, the bonds in our sample are more frequently traded than a typical bond. The average monthly turnover -the bond's monthly trading volume as a percentage of its issuance size -is 7.51%, the average number of trades in a month is 208.
The median trade size is $324,000. For the the whole sample in TRACE, the average monthly turnover is 3.71%, the average number of trades in a month is 33 and the median trade size is $65,000. Thus, the bonds in our sample are also relatively more liquid. Given that our focus is to study the significance of illiquidity for corporate bonds, such a bias in our sample towards more liquid bonds, although not ideal, will only help to strengthen our results if they show up for the most liquid bonds.
In addition to the TRACE data, we use CRSP to obtain stock returns for the market and the respective bond issuers. We use FISD to obtain bond-level information such as issue date, issuance size, coupon rate, and credit rating, as well as to identify callable, convertible and putable bonds. We use Bloomberg to collect the quoted bid-ask spreads for the bonds in our sample, from which we have data for 1,032 out of the 1,035 bonds in our sample. 8 We use
Datastream to collect Barclays Bond indices to calculate the default spread and returns on the aggregate corporate bond market and also to gather CDS spreads. To calculate yield spreads for individual corporate bonds, we obtain Treasury bond yields from the Federal Reserve, which publishes constant maturity Treasury rates for a range of maturities. Finally, we obtain the VIX index from CBOE.
Measure of Illiquidity and Its Properties

Measuring Illiquidity
Although a precise definition of illiquidity and its quantification will depend on a specific model, two properties are clear. First, illiquidity arises from market frictions, such as costs and constraints for trading and capital flows; second, its impact to the market is transitory.
Thus, we construct a measure of illiquidity that is motivated by these two properties.
As such, the focus, as well as the contribution, of our paper is mainly empirical. To facilitate our analysis, however, let us think in terms of the following simple model. Let P t denote the clean price -the full value minus accrued interest since the last coupon dateof a bond at time t, and p t = ln P t denote the log price. We start by assuming that p t consists of two components:
The first component f t represents its fundamental value -the log price in the absence of frictions, which follows a random walk; the second component u t comes from the impact of illiquidity, which is transitory (and uncorrelated with the fundamental value). 9 In such a framework, the magnitude of the transitory price component u t characterizes the level of illiquidity in the market. γ is aimed at extracting the transitory component in the observed price p t . Specifically, let Δp t = p t − p t−1 be the price change from t − 1 to t. We define the measure of illiquidity γ by
With the assumption that the fundamental component f t follows a random walk, γ depends only on the transitory component u t , and it increases with the magnitude of u t .
Several comments are in order before we proceed with our empirical analysis of γ. First, we know little about the dynamics of u t , other than its transitory nature. For example, when u t follows an AR(1) process, we have γ = (1−ρ)σ 2 /(1+ρ), where σ is the instantaneous volatility of u t , and 0 ≤ ρ < 1 is its persistence coefficient. In this case, while γ does provide a simple gauge of the magnitude of u t , it combines various aspects of u t (e.g., σ and ρ). Second, for the purpose of measuring illiquidity, other aspects of u t that are not fully captured by γ may also matter. In other words, γ itself gives only a partial measure of illiquidity. Third, given the potential richness in the dynamics of u t , γ will in general depend on the horizon over which we measure price changes. This horizon effect is important because γ measured over different horizons may capture different aspects of u t or illiquidity. For most of our analysis, we will 9 Such a separation assumes that the fundamental value f t carries no time-varying risk premium. This is a reasonable assumption over short horizons. It is equivalent to assuming that high frequency variations in expected returns are ultimately related to market frictions -otherwise, arbitrage forces would have driven them away. To the extent that illiquidity can be viewed as a manifestation of these frictions, price movements giving rise to high frequency variations in expected returns should be included in u t . Admittedly, a more precise separation of f t and u t must rely on a pricing theory incorporating frictions or illiquidity. See, for example, Huang and Wang (2009) and Vayanos and Wang (2009). use either trade-by-trade prices or end of the day prices in estimating γ. Consequently, our γ estimate captures more of the high frequency components in transitory price movements. Table 2 summarizes the illiquidity measure γ for the bonds in our sample. Focusing first on Panel A, in which γ is estimated bond-by-bond using either trade-by-trade or daily data, we see an illiquidity measure of γ that is important both economically and statistically.
10 For the full sample period from 2003 through 2009, the illiquidity measure γ has a cross-sectional average of 0.63 with a robust t-stat of 19.42 when estimated using trade-by-trade data, and an average of 1.18 with a robust t-stat of 16.53 using daily data. 11 More importantly, the significant mean estimate of γ is not generated by just a few highly illiquid bonds. Using trade-by-trade data, the cross-sectional median of γ is 0.34, and 99.81% of the bonds have a statistically significant γ (t-stat of γ greater than or equal to 1.96); using daily data, the cross-sectional median of γ is 0.56 and over 98% of the bonds have a statistically significant γ.
Moreover, breaking our full sample by year shows that the illiquidity measure γ is important and stable across years.
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For each bond, we can further break down its overall illiquidity measure γ to gauge the relative contribution from trades of various sizes. Specifically, for each bond, we sort its trades by size into the smallest 30%, middle 40%, and largest 30% and then estimate γ small , γ medium and γ large using prices associated with the corresponding trade sizes. The results are summarized in Table 12 in the Appendix. We find that our overall illiquidity measure is not driven only by small trades. In particular, we find significant illiquidity across all trade sizes.
For example, using daily data, the cross-sectional means of γ small , γ medium and γ large are 1.58, 1.06, and 0.64, respectively, each with very high statistical significance.
As a comparison to the level of illiquidity for individual bonds, Panel B of Table 2 reports γ measured using equal-or issuance-weighted portfolios constructed from the same cross-section 10 To be included in our sample, the bond must trade on at least 75% of business days and at least 10 observations of the paired price changes, (Δp t , Δp t−1 ), are required to calculate γ. In calculating γ using daily data, price changes may be between prices over multiple days if a bond does not trade during a day. We limit the difference in days to one week though this criteria rarely binds due to our sample selection criteria.
11 The robust t-stats are calculated using standard errors that are corrected for cross-sectional and timeseries correlations. Specifically, the moment condition for estimating γ isγ + Δp The γ measure could be affected by the presence of persistent small trades, which could be a result of the way dealers deal bonds to retail traders. We thank the referee for raising this point. Such persistent small trades will bias γ downward. In other words, the γ measures would have been larger in the absence of such persistent small trades. Moreover, it will have a larger impact on γ measured using prices associated small trade sizes. As we discuss in the next paragraph, we find significant illiquidity across all trade sizes. of bonds and for the same sample period. In contrast to its counterpart at the individual bond level, γ at the portfolio level is slightly negative, rather small in magnitude, and statistically insignificant. This implies that the transitory component extracted by the γ measure is idiosyncratic in nature and gets diversified away at the portfolio level. It does not imply, however, that the illiquidity in corporate bonds lacks a systematic component, which we will examine later in Section 3.3. At the individual bond level, γ is calculated using either trade-by-trade or daily data. Per t-stat ≥ 1.96 reports the percentage of bond with statistically significant γ. Robust t-stat is a test on the cross-sectional mean of γ with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and time-series correlations. At the portfolio level, γ is calculated using daily data and the Newey-West t-stats are reported. Monthly quoted bid-ask spreads, which we have data for 1,032 out of 1,035 bonds in our sample, are used to calculate the implied γ.
Panel C of Table 2 provides another and perhaps more important gauge of the magnitude of our estimated γ for individual bonds. Using quoted bid-ask spreads for the same crosssection of bonds and for the same sample period, we estimate a bid-ask implied γ for each bond by computing the magnitude of negative autocovariance that would have been generated by bid-ask bounce. For the full sample period, the cross-sectional mean of the implied γ is 0.034 and the median is 0.026, which are more than one order of magnitude smaller than the empirically observed γ for individual bonds. As shown later in the paper, not only does the quoted bid-ask spread fail to capture the overall level of illiquidity, but it also fails to explain the cross-sectional variation in bond illiquidity and its asset pricing implications.
Although our focus is on extracting the transitory component at the trade-by-trade and daily frequencies, it is interesting to provide a general picture of γ over varying horizons. Moving from the trade-by-trade to daily horizon, our results in Table 2 show that the magnitude of the illiquidity measure γ becomes larger. Given that the autocovariance at the daily level cumulatively captures the mean-reversion at the trade-by-trade level, this implies that the mean-reversion at the trade-by-trade level persists for a few trades before fully dissipating, which we show in Section 6.1. Moving from the daily to weekly horizon, we find that the magnitude of γ increases slightly from an average level of 1.18 to 1.21, although its statistical significance decreases to a robust t-stat of 14.16, and 77.88% of the bonds in our sample have a positive and statistically significant γ at this horizon. Extending to the bi-weekly and monthly horizons, γ starts to decline in both magnitude and statistical significance.
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As mentioned earlier in the section, the transitory component u t might have richer dynamics than what can be offered by a simple AR(1) structure for u t . By extending γ over various horizons, we are able to uncover some of the dynamics. We show in Section 6.1 that at the trade-by-trade level u t is by no means a simple AR(1). Likewise, in addition to the mean-reversion at the daily horizon that is captured in this paper, the transitory component u t may also have a slow moving mean-reversion component at a longer horizon. To examine this issue more thoroughly is an interesting topic, but requires time-series data for a longer sample period than ours.
14 13 At a bi-weekly horizon, the mean gamma is 1.16 with a t-stat of 6.37. 42.18% of the bonds have a significant gamma. At the monthly horizon, gamma is 0.80 with a t-stat of 2.02 and only 17.09% are significant. In addition to having fewer observations, Using longer horizons also decreases the signal to noise ratio as the fundamental volatility starts to build up. See Harris (1990) for the exact small sample moments of the serial covariance estimator and of the standard variance estimator for price changes generated by the Roll spread model.
14 By using monthly bid prices from 1978 to 1998, Khang and King (2004) report contrarian patterns in corporate bond returns over horizons of one to six months. Instead of examining autocovariance in bond returns, their focus is on the cross-sectional effect. Sorting bonds by their past monthly (or bi-monthly up to 6 months) returns, they find that past winners under perform past losers in the next month (or 2-month up to 6 months). Their result, however, is relatively weak and is significant only in the early half of their sample and goes away in the second half of their sample (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) .
Illiquidity and Bond Characteristics
Our sample includes a broad cross-section of bonds, which allows us to examine the connection between the illiquidity measure γ and various bond characteristics, some of which are known to be linked to bond liquidity. The variation in γ and bond characteristics is reported in Table 3 . We use daily data to construct yearly estimates of γ for each bond and perform pooled regressions on various bond characteristics. Reported in square brackets are the tstats calculated using standard errors clustered by year.
We find that older bonds on average have higher γ, and the results are robust regardless of which control variables are used in the regression. On average, a bond that is one-year older is associated with an increase of 0.19 in its γ, which accounts for more than 15% of the fullsample average of γ. Given that the age of a bond has been widely used in the fixed-income market as a proxy for illiquidity, it is important that we establish this connection between γ and age. Similarly, we find that bonds with smaller issuance tend to have larger γ. We also find that bonds with longer time to maturity typically have higher γ. We do not find a significant relation between credit ratings and γ, and this can be attributed to the fact that our sample includes investment-grade bonds only.
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Given that we have transaction-level data, we can also examine the connection between γ and bond trading activity. We find that, by far, the most interesting variable is the average trade size of a bond. In particular, bonds with smaller trade sizes have higher illiquidity measure γ. We also find that bonds with a larger number of trades are have higher γ and are less liquid. In other words, more trades do not imply more liquidity, especially if these trades are of small sizes.
To examine the connection between γ and quoted bid-ask spreads, we use quoted bid-ask spreads to obtain bid-ask implied γ's. We find a positive relation between our γ measure and the γ measure implied by the quoted bid-ask spread. It is interesting to point out, however, that adding the bid-ask implied γ as an explanatory variable does not alter the relation between our γ measure and liquidity-related bond characteristics such as age and size. Overall, we find that the magnitude of illiquidity captured by our γ measure is related to but goes beyond the information contained in the quoted bid-ask spreads.
Finally, given the extent of CDS activity during our sample period and its close relation with the corporate bond market, it is also interesting for us to explore the connection between γ and information from the CDS market. We find two interesting results. First, we find that whether or not a bond issuer has CDS traded on it does not affect the bond's liquidity. Given that our sample includes only investment-grade bonds and over 90% of the bond-years in our sample have traded CDS, this result is hardly surprising. Second, we find that, within the CDS sample, bonds with higher CDS spreads have significantly higher γ's and are therefore less liquid. This implies that even at the name issuer level, there is a close connection between credit and liquidity risks. We now move on to the aggregate level to examine whether or not this liquidity risk has a systematic component and explores its relation with the systematic credit risk.
Aggregate Illiquidity and Market Conditions
Next, we examine how the illiquidity of corporate bonds varies over time. Instead of considering individual bonds, we are more interested in the comovement in their illiquidity. For this purpose, we construct an aggregate measure of illiquidity using the bond-level illiquidity measure. We first construct, with a monthly frequency, a cross-section of γ's for all individual bonds using daily data within that month. 16 We then use the cross-sectional median γ as the aggregate γ measure. In calculating the monthly autocovariance of price changes, we can demean the price change using the sample mean within the month, within the year, or over the entire sample period. It depends on whether we view the monthly variation in the mean of price change as noise or as some low-frequency movement related to the fundamental. In practice, however, this time variation is rather small compared with the high-frequency bouncing around the mean. As a result, demeaning using the monthly mean or the sample mean generates very similar results. Here we report the results using the former.
17 Compared with the cross-sectional mean of γ, the median γ is a more conservative measure and is less sensitive to those highly illiquid bonds that were most severely affected by the credit market turmoil. 
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The connection between the aggregate γ and broader market conditions indicates that although it is constructed using only corporate bond data, the aggregate illiquidity captured here seems to have a wider reach than this particular market. Indeed, as reported in Table 4 , regressing monthly changes in aggregate γ on contemporaneous changes in the CBOE VIX index, we obtain a slope coefficient of 0.0468 with a t-stat of 6.45, and the R-squared of the OLS regression is over 67%. This result is not driven just by the 2008 sub-prime crisis:
excluding data from 2008 and 2009, the positive relation is still robust: the slope coefficient is 0.0162 with a t-stat of 2.87 and the R-squared is 33%.
The fact that the aggregate illiquidity measure γ has a close connection with the VIX index is a rather intriguing result. While one measure is captured from the trading of individual corporate bonds, to gauge the overall liquidity condition of the market, the other is captured from the pricing of the S&P 500 index options, often referred to as the "fear gauge" of the market. Our result seems to indicate that there is a non-trivial interaction between shocks to market illiquidity and shocks to market risk and/or risk appetite. Table 4 are the relation between the aggregate γ and other marketcondition variables. As a proxy for the overall credit risk, we consider an average CDS index, constructed as the average of five-year CDS spreads covered by CMA Datavision in
Also reported in
Datastream.
19 We find a weak positive relation between changes in aggregate γ and changes in
18 By focusing only on Phase I and II bonds in TRACE to maintain a reasonably balanced sample, we did not include bonds that were included only after Phase III, which was fully implemented on February 7, 2005. Consequently, new bonds issued after that date were excluded from our sample, even though some of them would have been eligible for Phase II had they been issued earlier. As a result, starting from February 7, 2005, we have a population of slowly aging bonds. Since γ is positively related to age, it might introduce a slight overall upward trend in γ. It should be mentioned that the sudden increases in aggregate γ during crises are too large to be explained by the slow aging process. Finally, to avoid regressing trend on trend, the time-series regression results presented later in this section are based on regressing changes on changes. we also did a robustness check by constructing a subsample of bonds with less of the aging effect, and our time-series results in this section remain the same.
the CDS index. Interestingly, if we exclude 2008 and 2009, the connection between the two is stronger. We also find that lagged bond returns are negatively related to changes in aggregate γ, indicating that, on average, negative bond market performance is followed by worsening liquidity conditions. Putting VIX into these regressions, however, these two variables become insignificant. The one market condition variable that is significant after controlling for VIX is the volatility of the Barclays US Investment Grade Corporate Bond Index, but this is only true if crisis period data is included. The analysis above leads to three conclusions. First, there is substantial commonality in the time variation of corporate bond illiquidity. Second, this time variation is correlated with overall market conditions. Third, changes in the aggregate γ exhibits strong positive correlation with changes in VIX.
Illiquidity and Bond Yields
After having established the empirical properties of the illiquidity measure γ, we now explore the connections between illiquidity and corporate bond pricing. In particular, we examine the extent to which illiquidity affects pricing, in both the time-series and the cross-section.
Aggregate Illiquidity and Aggregate Bond Yield Spreads
We use the Barclays US Corporate Bond Indices (formerly known as the Lehman Indices) to measure aggregate bond yield spreads of various ratings. We regress monthly changes in the aggregate bond yield spreads on monthly changes in the aggregate illiquidity measure γ and other market-condition variables. The results are reported in Table 5 .
We find that the aggregate γ plays an important role in explaining the monthly changes in the aggregate yield spreads. This is especially true for ratings A and above, where the aggregate γ is by far the most important variable, explaining over 51% of the monthly variation in yield spreads for AAA-rated bonds, 47% for AA-rated bonds, and close to 60% for A-rated bonds. Adding the CDS index as a proxy for credit risk, we find that it also plays an important role, but illiquidity remains the dominant factor in driving the yield spreads for ratings A and above. On the other hand, the CBOE VIX index does not have any additional explanatory power in the presence of the aggregate γ and the CDS index. This implies that despite their strong correlation, the aggregate γ is far from a mere proxy for VIX. It contains important information about bond yields while VIX does not provide any additional information.
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Overall, our results indicate that both illiquidity, as captured by the aggregate γ, and credit risk, as captured by the CDS index, are important drivers for high-rated yield spreads.
During normal market conditions, these two components seem to carry equal importance. This can be seen in Panel B of Table 5 , where only pre-2008 data are used. During the 2008 crisis, however, illiquidity becomes a much more important component, over-shadowing the credit 20 We have done additional tests regarding the marginal information changes in the aggregate γ and VIX provide, respectively, about changes in bond prices. When we replace changes in the aggregate γ by its residual after an projection on changes in VIX, the residual remains significant and substantial. However, when we replace VIX by its residual after an projection on changes in the aggregate γ, the residual is not significant. Our results also show that while aggregate illiquidity issue plays an important role in explaining the monthly changes in yield spreads for high-rated bonds, it is less important for junk bonds. For such bonds, credit risk is a more important component. This does not mean that junk bonds are more liquid. In fact, they are generally less liquid. Given the low credit quality of such bonds, however, they are more sensitive to the overall credit condition than the overall illiquidity condition. This is also consistent with the findings of Huang and Huang (2003) . Pricing corporate bonds using structural models of default, they find that, for the low-rated bonds, a large portion of their yield spreads can be explained by credit risk, while for high-rated bonds, credit risk can explain only a tiny portion of their yield spreads.
Bond-Level Illiquidity and Individual Bond Yield Spreads
We now examine how bond-level γ can help to explain the cross section of bond yields. For this purpose, we focus on the yield spread of individual bonds, which is the difference between the corporate bond yield and the Treasury bond yield of the same maturity. For Treasury yields, we use the constant maturity rate published by the Federal Reserve and use linear interpolation whenever necessary. We perform monthly cross-sectional regressions of the yield spreads on the illiquidity measure γ, along with a set of control variables.
The results are reported in Table 6 , where the t-stats are calculated using the FamaMacBeth standard errors with serial correlation corrected using Newey and West (1987) . To include callable bonds in our analysis, which constitute a large portion of our sample, we use a callable dummy, which is one if a bond is callable and zero otherwise. 22 We exclude all convertible and putable bonds from our analysis. In addition, we also include rating dummies for A and Baa. The first column in Table 6 shows that (controlling for callability), the average yield spread of the Aaa and Aa bonds in our sample is 129 bps, relative to which the A bonds are 61 bps higher, and Baa bonds are 176 bps higher.
As reported in the second column of Table 6 , adding γ to the regression does not bring much change to the relative yield spreads across ratings. This is to be expected since γ should capture more of a liquidity effect, and less of a fundamental risk effect, which is reflected in the differences in ratings. More importantly, we find that the coefficient on γ is 0.17 with a t-stat of 9.60. This implies that for two bonds in the same rating category, if one bond, presumably less liquid, has a γ that is higher than the other by 1, the yield spread of this bond is on average 17 bps higher than the other. To put an increase of 1 in γ in context, the cross-sectional standard deviation of γ is on average 2.03 in our sample. From this perspective, the illiquidity measure γ is economically important in explaining the cross-sectional variation in average bond yields.
To control for the fundamental risk of a bond above and beyond what is captured by the rating dummies, we use equity volatility estimated using daily equity returns of the bond issuer. Effectively, this variable is a combination of the issuer's asset volatility and leverage.
We find this variable to be important in explaining yield spreads. As shown in the third column of Table 6 , the slope coefficient on equity volatility is 0.02 with a t-stat of 3.36. That is, a ten percentage point increase in the equity volatility of a bond issuer is associated with a 20 bps increase in the bond yield. While adding γ improves the cross-sectional R-squared from a time-series average of 19.00% to 30.27%, adding equity volatility improves the R-squared to 25.97%. Such R-squareds, however, should be interpreted with caution since it is a timeseries average of cross-sectional R-squared, and does not take into account the cross-sectional correlations in the regression residuals. By contrast, our reported Fama-MacBeth t-stats do and γ has a stronger statistical significance. It is also interesting to observe that by adding equity volatility, the magnitudes of the rating dummies decrease significantly. This is to be expected since both equity volatility and rating dummies are designed to control for the bond's fundamental risk.
When used simultaneously to explain the cross-sectional variation in bond yield spreads, 22 In the Appendix, we also report results with callable bonds excluded. both γ and equity volatility are significant, with the slope coefficients for both remaining more or less the same as before. This implies a limited interaction between the two variables, which is to be expected since the equity volatility is designed to pick up the fundamental information about a bond while γ is to capture its liquidity information. Moreover, the statistical significance of γ is virtually unchanged.
Taking advantage of the fact that a substantial sub-sample of our bonds have CDS traded on their issuers, we use CDS spreads as an additional control for the fundamental risk of a bond. We find a very strong relation between bond yields and CDS yields: the coefficient is 0.69 with a t-stat of 12.94. For the sub-sample of bonds with CDS traded, and controlling for the CDS spread, we still find a strong cross-sectional relation between γ and bond yields. The economic significance of the relation is smaller: a cross-sectional difference of γ of 1 translates to a 12 bps difference in bond yields.
Given that both bond age and bond issuance are known to be linked to liquidity, 23 we add these bond characteristics as controls, and find that the positive connection between γ and average bond yield spreads remains robust. Further adding the bond trading variables as controls, we find these variables do not have a strong impact on the positive relation between the illiquidity measure γ and average yield spreads.
We also examine the relative importance of the quoted bid-ask spreads and γ. As shown in the last two columns of Table 6 , the quoted bid-ask spreads are negatively related average yield spreads. Using both the quoted bid-ask spreads and γ, we find a robust result for γ and a statistically insignificant result for the quoted bid-ask spread. This aspect of our result is different from that in Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) , who find a positive relation between the quoted bid-ask spreads and yield spreads. This discrepancy is mainly due to the recent crisis period. There is, in fact, a positive relation between quoted bid-ask spreads and yield spreads before 2008. This, however, does not affect our results for γ, which remain economically and statistically significant even if only pre-2008 data is used. Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) also use zero return days as a proxy for illiquidity. 24 As zero return days are meant to be a proxy for non-trading while we directly observe trading, we instead use the % of days with trading. When we include this measure in the regression, it comes in significant, but with the wrong sign.
23 See, for example, Houweling, Mentink, and Vorst (2003) and additional references therein.
24 See Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) for a discussion of when the zero return measure is appropriate.
Illiquidity and Bid-Ask Spread
It is well known that the bid-ask spread can lead to negative autocovariance in price changes.
For example, using a simple specification, Roll (1984) shows that when transactions prices bounce between bid and ask prices, depending on whether they are sell or buy orders from customers, their changes exhibit negative autocovariance even when the "underlying value"
follows a random walk. Thus, it is important to ask whether or not the negative autocovariances documented in this paper are simply a reflection of bid-ask bounce. Using quoted bid-ask spreads, we show in Table 2 that the associated bid-ask bounce can only generate a tiny fraction of the empirically observed autocovariance in corporate bonds. Quoted spreads, however, are mostly indicative rather than binding. Moreover, the structure of the corporate bond market is mostly over-the-counter, making it even more difficult to estimate the actual bid-ask spreads. 25 Thus, a direct examination of how bid-ask spreads contribute to the illiquidity measure γ is challenging.
We can, however, address this question to certain extent by taking advantage of the results by Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) (EHP hereafter). Using a more detailed version of the TRACE data that includes the side on which the dealer participated, they provide estimates of effective bid-ask spreads for corporate bonds. To examine the extent to which γ can be explained by the estimated bid-ask spread, we use γ to compute the implied bid-ask spreads, and compare them with the estimated bid-ask spreads reported by EHP. The actual comparison will not be exact, since our sample of bonds is different from theirs. Later in the section, we will discuss how this could affect our analysis.
It is first instructive to understand the theoretical underpinning of how our estimate of γ relates to the estimate of bid-ask spreads in EHP. In the Roll (1984) model, the log transaction price p t takes the form of equation (1), in which p is the sum of the fundamental value (in log) and a transitory component. Moreover, the transitory component equals to Specifically, q is +1 if the transaction is buyer initiated and −1 if it is seller initiated, assuming that the dealer takes the other side. More specifically, in the Roll model, we have
If we further assume that q t is i.i.d. over time, the autocovariance in price change then becomes
where we call s Roll the implied bid-ask spread.
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EHP use an enriched Roll model, which allows the spreads to depend on trade sizes. In particular, they assume
where V t is the size of the trade at time t. 27 Since the dataset used by EHP also contains information about q t , they directly estimate the first difference of equation (5), assuming a factor model for the increments of f t . The bid-ask spreads are calculated using log prices and are reported in percentages. The EHP bid-ask spread estimates are from Table 4 of Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) , and the EHP subperiod is Jan. 2003 to Jan. 2005. Our bid-ask spreads are obtained using Roll's measure: 2 √ γ divided by the average market value of the bond. The sample of bonds differs from that in EHP, and our selection criteria biases us toward more liquid bonds with smaller bid-ask spreads. Table 7 reproduces In general, the spread s t can be time dependent, dependent on q t and q t can be serially correlated (see, for example, Rosu (2009) and Obizhaeva and Wang (2009) ). It then becomes harder to interpret γ as simply a reflection of actual bid-ask spreads. Of course, we can still use equation (4) to define an implied spread. 27 The model EHP use has an additional feature. It distinguishes customer-dealer trades from dealer-dealer trades. The spread they estimate is for the customer-dealer trades. Thus, in (5), we simply do not identify dealer-dealer trades. This decreases our estimate of γ relative to EHP since we are including inter-dealer trades which have a smaller spread than customer-dealer trades.
that center around their reported trade sizes. For example, to compare with their trade size $10K, we calculate γ conditional on trade sizes falling between $7.5K and $15K, and then calculate the implied bid-ask spread. The results are reported in Table 7 , where to correct for the difference in our respective sample periods, we also report our implied bid-ask spreads for the period used by EHP. For the EHP sample period, the cross-sectional medians of our implied percentage bid-ask spreads are 1.80%, 1.77%, 1.53%, 1.22%, 92 bps, 67 bps, 51 bps, and 54 bps, respectively. As we move on to compare our median estimates to those in EHP, it should be mentioned that this is a simple comparison by magnitudes, not a formal statistical test.
Overall, our implied spreads are much higher than those estimated by EHP. For small trades, our median estimates of implied spreads are over 50% higher than those by EHP.
Moving to larger trades, the difference becomes even more substantial. Our median estimates are close to doubling theirs for the average sizes of $100K and $200K, close to two-and-a-half times theirs for the average size of $500K, and more than quadrupling theirs for the average size of $1,000K. In fact, our estimates are biased downward for the trade size group around $1,000K, since our estimated bid-ask spreads include all trade sizes above $750K, including trade sizes of $2M, $5M, and $10M, whose median bid-ask spreads are estimated by EHP to be 6 bps, 2 bps, and 2 bps, respectively. We have to group such trade sizes because in the publicly available TRACE data, the reported trade size is truncated at $1M for speculative grade bonds and at $5M for investment grade bonds. Though we only use bonds when they are investment grade, TRACE continues to truncate some bonds at $1M even after the bond is upgraded to investment grade.
In addition to differing in sample periods, which is easy to correct, our sample is also different from that used in EHP in the composition of the bonds that are used to estimate the bid-ask spreads. In particular, our selection criteria bias our sample towards highly liquid bonds. For example, to be included in our sample, the bond has to trade at least 75% of business days, while the median frequency of days with a trade is only 48% for the bonds used while the median average number of trades per day is 1.1 for the bonds used in EHP. Given that more liquid bonds typically have smaller bid-ask spreads, the difference between our implied bid-ask spreads and EHP's estimates would have been even more drastic had we been able to match our sample of bonds to theirs. It is therefore our conclusion that the negative autocovariance in price changes observed in the bond market is much more substantial than merely the bid-ask effect. And γ captures more broadly the impact of illiquidity in the market.
Finally, one might be curious as to what is the exact mechanism that drives our estimates apart from those by EHP. Within the Roll model as specified in equation (4), our estimates should be identical to theirs. In particular, using equation (3) to identify bid-ask spread s implies regressing Δp t on Δq t . But using our model specified in equation (1) 
Dynamic Properties of Illiquidity
To further examine the dynamic properties of the transitory component in corporate bonds, we measure the autocovariance of price changes that are separated by a few trades or a few days:
The illiquidity measure we have used so far is simply γ 1 . For τ > 1, γ τ measures the extent to which the mean-reversion persists after the initial price reversal at τ = 1. In Table 8 , we report the γ τ for τ = 1, 2, 3, using trade-by-trade data. Clearly, the initial bounce back is the strongest while the mean-reversion still persists after skipping a trade. In particular, γ 2 is on average 0.12 with a robust t-stat of 13.76. At the individual bond level, 72% of the bonds have a statistically significant γ 2 . After skipping two trades, the amount of residual mean-reversion dissipates further in magnitude. The cross-sectional average of γ 3 is only 0.030, although it is still statistically significant with a robust t-stat of 10.04. At the individual bond level, fewer than 14% of the bonds have a statistically significant γ 3 . For each bond, its γ τ , τ = 1, 2, 3, is calculated using trade-by-trade data. Per t-stat ≥ 1.96 reports the percentage of bond with statistically significant γ. Robust t-stat is a test on the cross-sectional mean of γ with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and time-series correlations.
The fact that the mean-reversion persists for a few trades before fully dissipating implies that autocovariance at the daily level is stronger than at the trade-by-trade level as it captures the effect cumulatively, as shown in Table 2 . At the daily level, however, the mean-reversion dissipates rather quickly, with an insignificant γ 2 and γ 3 . For brevity, we omit these results.
Asymmetry in Price Reversals
One interesting question regarding the mean-reversion captured in our main result is whether or not the magnitude of mean-reversion is symmetric in the sign of the initial price change.
Specifically, with Δp properly demeaned, let γ − = −Cov (Δp t , Δp t+1 |Δp t < 0) be a measure of mean-reversion conditioning on an initial price change that is negative, and let γ + be the counterpart conditioning on a positive price change. In a simple theory of liquidity based on costly market participation, Huang and Wang (2009) show that the bounce-back effect caused by illiquidity is more severe conditioning on an initial price movement that is negative, predicting a positive difference between γ − and γ + .
We test this hypothesis in Table 9 , which shows that indeed there is a positive difference between γ − and γ + . Using trade-by-trade data, the cross-sectional average of γ − −γ + is 0.1190 with a robust t-stat of 9.48. Skipping a trade, the asymmetry in γ 2 is on average 0.0484 with a robust t-stat of 10.00. Compared with how γ τ dissipates across τ , this measure of asymmetry does not exhibit the same dissipating pattern. In fact, in the later sample period, the level of asymmetry for τ = 2 is almost as important for the first-order mean-reversion, with an even higher statistical significance. Using daily data, the asymmetry is stronger, incorporating the cumulative effect from the transaction level. The cross-sectional average of γ − − γ + is 0.23, which is close to 20% of the observed level of mean reversion. Skipping a day, however, produces no evidence of asymmetry, which is expected since there is very little evidence of mean-reversion at this level in the first place. 
Trade Size and Illiquidity
Since γ is based on transaction prices, a natural question is how it is related to the sizes of these transactions. In particular, are reversals in price changes stronger for trades of larger or smaller sizes? In order to answer this question, we consider the autocovariance of price changes conditional on different trade sizes.
For a change in price p t − p t−1 , let V t denote the size of the trade associated with price p t .
The autocovariance of price changes conditional on trade size being in a particular range, say, R, is defined as For the same reason, we construct our conditional γ using trade-by-trade data. Otherwise, the data would be cut too thin at the daily level to provide reliable estimates of conditional γ.
For each bond, we categorize transactions by their time-t trade sizes into their respective bracket s, with s = 1, 2, . . . , 6, and collect the corresponding pairs of price changes, p t − p t−1
and p t+1 − p t . Grouping such pairs of prices changes for each size bracket s and for each bond, we can estimate the autocovariance of the price changes, the negative of which is our conditional γ(s).
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Equipped with the conditional γ, we can now explore the link between trade size and illiquidity. In particular, does γ(s) vary with s and how? We answer this question by first controlling for the overall liquidity of the bond. This control is important as we find in Section 3.2 that the average trade size of a bond is an important determinant of the crosssectional variation of γ. So we first sort all bonds by their unconditional γ into quintiles and then examine the connection between γ(s) and s within each quintile.
As shown in Panel A of Table 10 , for each γ quintile, there is a pattern of decreasing conditional γ with increasing trade size and the relation is monotonic for all γ quintiles. For example, quintile 1 consists of bonds with the highest γ and therefore the least liquid in our sample. The mean γ is 2.46 for trade-size bracket 1 (less than $5K) but it decreases to 1.07 for trade-size bracket 6 (greater than $500K). The mean difference in γ between the trade-size bracket 1 and 6 is 1.28 and has a robust t-stat of 5.86. Likewise, for quintile 5, which consists of bonds with the lowest γ measure and therefore are the most liquid, the same pattern emerges.
The average value of γ is 0.21 for the smallest trades and then decreases monotonically to 0.02 for the largest trades. The difference between the two is 0.19, with a robust t-stat of 9.29, indicating that the conditional γ between small and large size trades remains significant even for the most liquid bonds. To check the potential impact of outliers, we also report the median γ for different trade sizes. Although the magnitudes are slightly smaller, the general pattern remains the same. Trade size is categorized into 6 groups with cutoffs of $5K, $15K, $25K, $75K, and $500K. γ = −Cov(p t − p t−1 , p t+1 − p t ). γ is calculated conditioning on the trade size associated with p t . Bonds are sorted by their "unconditional" γ into quintiles, and the variation of γ by trade size is reported for each quintile group. The trade-by-trade data is used in the calculation. For the daily data, the results are similar but stronger.
Overall, our results demonstrate a clear negative relation between trade sizes and γ.
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The interpretation of this result, however, requires caution. It would be simplistic to infer from this pattern that larger trades face less illiquidity or have less impact on prices. It is important to realize that both trades sizes and prices are endogenous variables. Their relation arises from an equilibrium outcome in which traders of different types optimally choose their trading strategies, taking into account the dynamics of the market including the actions of their own and others. Non-competitive factors such as negotiation power for large trades can also contribute to the relation between trade sizes and γ.
Conclusions
The main objective of our paper is to gauge the level of illiquidity in the corporate bond market and to examine its general properties and more importantly its impact on bond valuation.
Using a theoretically motivated measure of illiquidity, i.e., the amount of price reversals as captured by the negative of autocovariance of prices changes, we show that this illiquidity measure is both statistically and economically significant for a broad cross-section of corporate bonds examined in this paper. We demonstrate that the magnitude of the reversals is beyond what can be explained by bid-ask bounce. We also show that the reversals exhibit significant asymmetry: price reversals are on average stronger after a price reduction than a price increase.
We find that a bond's illiquidity is related to several bond characteristics. In particular, illiquidity increases with a bond's age and maturity, but decreases with its issuance size. In addition, we also find that price reversals are inversely related to trade sizes. That is, prices changes accompanied by small trades exhibit stronger reversals than those accompanied by large trades. We find important pricing implications associated with bond illiquidity. We show that the variation in aggregate liquidity is the dominate factor in explaining the time variation in bond indices for different ratings (with an R-squared around 20%), exceeding the credit factor, for all ratings of A and above. It becomes even more important if the crisis period is included (with R-squared around 50%). At the individual bond level, we find that γ can help to explain an important portion of the bond yield spread. For two bonds in the same rating category, a one-standard-deviation difference in their illiquidity measure would set their yield spreads apart by 35 bps. This result remains robust in economic and statistical significance, after controlling for bond fundamental information and bond characteristics including those commonly related to bond liquidity. Monthly Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression with the bond yield spread as the dependent variable. The t-stats are reported in square brackets calculated using Fama-MacBeth standard errors with serial correlation corrected using Newey-West. The reported number of observations are the average number of observations per period. The reported R-squareds are the time-series averages of the cross-sectional R-squareds. γ is the monthly estimate of illiquidity measure using daily data. Equity Vol is estimated using daily equity returns of the bond issuer. Age, Maturity, Issuance, Turnover, Trd Size, and #Trades are as defined in Table 3 γ is calculated using only trades of sizes in the smallest 30%, middle 40%, or largest 30% for each bond. Per t-stat ≥ 1.96 reports the percentage of bond with statistically significant γ. Robust t-stat is a test on the cross-sectional mean of γ with standard errors corrected for cross-sectional and time-series correlations.
